Singapore's government imposes demand restrictions in 2011 and 2013 disallowing Singaporean residents to concurrently own a private housing unit and a resale public housing flat. The restrictions, however, do not affect public housing owners, who fulfill the minimum occupation period requirement. This paper uses the policy shocks to set up a quasi-experiment to test if differential housing purchasing behaviors exist between the private housing and the public housing buyers. Using private housing transaction data between 2005 and 2015, we find that prices decline by 2.4% and 1.8% for the private housing owners' purchases after the policy took effects in 2010 and 2013, respectively, relative to public housing owners' purchases. Public housing owners could be motivated by housing wealth accrued to their existing flats to pay higher prices in their private housing purchases. We also find stronger treatment effects in resale market, core central region, medium to high-end market, and market with large size units.
Introduction
Restricting supply through zoning regulations causes high housing prices to decline in some US cities (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003) . The supply-side restriction widens the gap between housing price and replacement costs making housing less affordable. Relaxing the zoning restrictions has been advocated as a way to solve housing affordability problems in high housing price cities (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003) . However, this policy has not been well received in many Asian cities, which are compact and dense. Many Asian governments use demand-side restrictions to curb housing purchases in their attempts to cool the overheating housing markets (Sun, Zheng, Geltner and Wang, 2016) .
The Singapore's housing market has witnessed a strong recovery in prices from the trough in 2Q2009. The private residential property price index published by the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) shows a year-on-year increase of 38.2% between 2Q2009 and 2Q2010. This prompted Singapore's government to swiftly intervene into the private housing market by implementing two rounds of cooling measures in September 2009 and February 2010. These measures include banning interest-only housing loans for properties under construction, imposing a seller stamp duty (SSD) on properties sold within a year of purchase, and lowering the maximum loan to value (LTV) ratio to 80% for new mortgages.
On 30 August 2010, the third round of cooling measures was introduced, which include a policy that bans concurrent ownerships of a public housing flat and a private property by Singaporean residents (hereafter referred to as "the concurrent ownership policy", or in short "the policy").
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With this policy, private housing owners who buy a resale public housing flat after 30 August 2010 are required to sell their private properties within 6 months from the date of purchase. Alongside with the concurrent ownership policy, the "minimum occupation period" (MOP) was extended from the previous 3 years to 5 years, which means that public housing flat owners are no longer allow to sell their public housing flats within 5 years. These two policies jointly prohibit public housing owners, who are either a Singapore citizen (SC) or a Singapore's permanent resident (SPR), from buying private properties within the 5-year MOP. The concurrent ownership rule is, however, not binding outside the 5-year MOP. On 12 January 2013, the concurrent ownership policy is further tightened by disallowing public housing owners, who are SPRs, to concurrently own private properties, even after meeting the 5-year MOP requirement. Only public housing owners who are SCs are allowed to buy a private property after living in their public housing flats for 5 years or more.
Singapore is not the only country imposing the demand-side restriction; the Chinese government also introduces the demand-side restriction on 30 April 2010 to curb speculative activities in Beijing's markets. 2 Administrated through the "Hukou" system (the residence registration), the measures ban housing purchases by non-Beijing residents; and disallow Beijing residents to buy second and more houses. Sun, Zheng, Geltner and Wang (2016) show that the demand-restricting measures cause Beijing's housing prices to drop by 17% to 32%, and the price-to-rent ratio to reduce by 23% to 29%. Housing transaction volume in Beijing dropped by more than half after imposing the demand restrictions. The policies restricting demand are fundamentally different in China and Singapore. While Beijing's policy is targeted at non-Beijing home buyers and Beijing-based investors; Singapore's policy protects genuine buyers from being crowded out from the resale public housing market by other private housing buyers, who may include foreigners, SCs and SPRs.
We use the concurrent ownership policy to set up a quasi-policy experiment in Singapore's private housing market with the following three motivations. First, the concurrent ownership restrictions discriminately keep private housing buyers out of the resale public housing market, but do not stop qualified public housing buyers (who meet the 5-year MOP requirement) from buying second private properties. The asymmetry in the policy shocks is used to disentangle differential effects, if exist, between public housing buyers and private housing buyers. Second, the unique features of the two housing markets that are segmented and not perfectly substitutable allows us to test if the demand restrictions could spillover from one market (public housing market) into another market (private housing market). Third, the asymmetric nature of the concurrent ownership policy is useful to disentangle the demand-restriction effects from effects related to other less discriminatory policy tools introduced around the same periods, such as SSD and LTV ratio. We should not observe differential behavioural responses between private and public housing buyers, if the concurrent policy treatment is not asymmetric relative to other non-discriminatory policy tools.
Based on buyers' home addresses, we sort buyers into a private housing buyer group (the treatment group) and a public housing buyer group (the control group). Using 10 years of private housing transaction data from the Real Estate Information System (REALIS), we empirically test differential house purchasing behaviours of the two groups of buyers in the private housing markets using a difference-in-differences (DID) framework. The results show that private owners' housing purchase prices decline significantly by 2.4% and 1.8% relative to public housing owners' purchases in the private housing market, after the introduction of the concurrent ownership policies in 2010 and 2013, respectively. There are three possible explanations for the negative price effects associated with the demand restricting policies on private housing buyers. First, private owners with concurrent holding of public houses and 2
This "Hukou" system induces rent seeking among some Beijing residents, who resorted to use "fake divorces" to bypass the restrictions in home purchases. Some Chinese couples fabricate "divorce" and transfer to the home-ownership rights to spouses, so that they could buy the second apartments. Source: Esther Fung, "China Sets Home-Ownership Curbs", The Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2013. private houses are compelled to sell their private houses in order to keep their public houses. 3 Second, public housing owners with accrued wealth in their public housing units pay price premiums to upgrade to private housing (Case, Quigley and Shiller, 2005; Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein and Lum, 2003) . Third, public housing owners face information disadvantages when buying houses in the private housing market compared to private housing owners.
We observe significant heterogeneity in the policy effects in sub-segments of the private housing markets in the post-2011 period. The negative price effect is stronger for resale (completed) housing units than housing units under construction (new sales); and the policy impact is also more strongly felt by private housing buyers in the core central region than in the fringe region. By housing type, we observe larger price declines in the medium to highprice market segment relative to the low-price market segment; and in large-sized units relative to small "shoe-box" units. Despite general declines in the private housing demand in the postpolicy periods, public housing owners' transactions make up the bulk of the transactions in the new sale market, the fringe area, and the better quality private housing segment (upper 75% and non-shoebox housing units). The upward mobility of public housing buyers generates enough demand to fill in the gap created by the exodus of private housing buyers in the private housing market after the demand restriction periods. The housing wealth and information asymmetric stories could explain the price premiums paid by public housing buyers in private housing purchases.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Sections 3 covers an overview of Singapore's housing market, and the policies imposing demand-side restrictions. Section 4 displays data sources and empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results and discusses. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
This study is related to the two strands of literature relating to demand-side and supply-side restrictions in housing markets. The first strand examines government's policies on housing restrictions, and the second strand covers a broader story on housing consumption and investment. Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) show that building restrictions that "artificially" curb the supply cause significant price inflation high price cities in the US. They argue that the housing affordability in these inelastic supply cities is directly caused by price increases, but independent of households' ability to pay (income). The government could increase supply and reduce the demand and supply mismatch by removing building restrictions in the housing market. In China, the government uses the "Hukou" system to exclude non-residents from 3 Unfortunately, we do not have empirical data to verify the effects of force-sales by private housing owners, who co-own public housing units after 2010.
buying houses and curb residents from buying second houses for investment in Beijing. Sun, Zheng, Geltner and Wang (2016) show that the policies cause prices and transaction volumes to drop significantly restoring stability to the Beijing's housing markets. T Housing is both a consumption and an investment good (Kraft and Munk, 2011) . The wealth effects created by owning housing asset could influence households' decisions in consumption and precautionary saving (Gan, 2010) . In the housing literature, there are three broad hypotheses that predict a positive price-volume relationship, which include the down-payment constraints (Stein, 1995; and Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2004, 2006) , the loss aversion Mayer, 1997, 2001) , and the search hypotheses (Wheaton, 1990) . Several macro-studies find evidence that households cash out price gains in starter home and use the proceeds to pay down-payments for larger houses. The liquidity-induced upward mobility generate positive price and sale turnovers relationships in housing markets (Hort, 2000; Leung et al, 2002; Andrew and Meen, 2003; Leung and Feng, 2005) . There is similar macro-evidence in Singapore's housing markets that show active upward mobility activities by owners who realize significant housing gains by selling their starter (public) houses (Ong, 2000; Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein and Lum, 2003; Edelstein and Lum, 2004; Lee and Ong, 2005; and Sing, Tsai and Chen, 2006 (Hughes and McCormick, 1981; 1985(a) and (b), 1987; Clark and Onaka, 1983; Henley, 1998) , changing labor market conditions are unlikely to have the same effects on housing mobility in the small island state of Singapore.
Given that housing goods are indivisible and fixed in location, Fu (1995) argues that households use the "moving" process to discretely smooth out inter-temporal housing consumption. Households adjust their housing consumption by substituting their existing houses for larger houses or investing in other properties. The household mobility process improves the match between the consumption preference and the supply of housing goods, and reduces social cost of providing housing goods. However, Tu et al (2009) show that in falling markets, housing price volatility could hold back sellers' decisions to sell houses.
This paper contributes to the first strand of literature by showing that the concurrent ownership restrictions creates differential behaviors between the private and the public housing buyers in Singapore's private housing market. The demand restrictions have more adverse effects on private housing buyers, where are evidenced by larger declines in prices of private housing purchases relative to public housing buyers' purchases in the post-demand restriction periods. Our study also contributes to the second strand of literature by showing significant crossmarket spillover effects of the demand restrictions in the resale public housing market on the private housing markets. The demand restrictions hasten public housing buyers' upgrading process, and cause price increases in the private housing market, especially in the better quality housing segments. The upward mobility is also likely to be triggered by the wealth effect accrued to the public housing buyers.
Singapore's Housing Markets

Housing Market Structure
Singapore has a dual housing market structure, which is made up of a public market and a private housing market. The public market provides housing for approximately 82.4% of Singapore Citizens (SCs) and Singapore Permanent Residents (SPRs) (Source: Department of Statistics, 2010). The government, through its housing agency -Housing and Development Board (HDB), builds and sells new public housing flats (or commonly known as "built to order" (BTO) flats 4 ) at subsidised prices to SCs who meet the HDB's eligibility criteria. Eligible SC flat buyers must form a family nucleus and their household monthly income shall not exceed S$12,000 when applying for public housing flats.
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In addition to the primary public housing market, there is a laissez-faire secondary resale market coexisted to facilitate buying and selling of public housing flats by SCs and SPRs at open market prices. Owners of BTO flats are required to stay in their public housing flats for a minimum occupation period (MOP) of 5 years. They are not allowed to sell or sublet their flats during the MOP period. 9 After the 5-year time bar, owners can sell their flats to SCs and SPRs in the resale public housing market. In resale public housing market, the income ceiling is not binding on resale housing buyers; and foreigners are allowed to own; but they could rent public housing flats from SC owners.
The private housing market is a laissez-fair market comprising landed properties (such as detached houses, semi-detached houses and terrace houses) and non-landed properties (such as apartments and condominiums). Landed properties are expensive and mostly out of the reach of average Singaporean housing buyers. Under the Residential Property Act, foreigners are not allowed to buy landed houses, except for landed houses in a small pocket of designated areas in Sentosa Island. Non-landed houses form the second largest housing segment after the public housing. The ownership rate in the non-landed private housing market increases rapidly from 6.5% in 2000 to 11.5% in 2010.
Condominiums and apartments are the two types of non-landed housing built and sold by private developers. In Singapore, condominiums requires a minimum land size of 0.4 hectare;
4
The BTO term refers to the new flat allocation system adopted by the HDB since 2001. In the new BTO system, construction of new public housing projects will only commence after receiving at least 70% of the applications for the new flats. The BTO term is used to represent new flats built by the HDB.
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The income ceiling for the BTO flats has been raised twice in a short span of 5 years, first from S$8,000 to S$10,000 in August 2011, and subsequently to S$12,000 with effect from August 2015.
9
The date of key collections is recognized by the HDB as the official reference date of the sale of flats (HDB, 2015) .
and they usually equipped with a full range of services and facilities including securities, parking facilities, landscaped gardens, and recreational facilities such as swimming pools, barbeque peats, tennis courts among others. Apartments built on smaller land parcels (less than 0.4 hectare) are usually standalone developments with facilities of less comprehensive scale. While there is no restriction on foreigners to buy condominiums; foreigners are not allowed to buy apartments of less than 6-storey in height under the Residential Property Act.
The non-landed housing markets are highly heterogeneous, both in terms of pricing and quality. Private developers build luxury non-landed housing units targeted at high income buyers on one hand, and build mass market non-landed housing units that are reasonably priced to meet the "upgrading" aspiration of public housing owners on the other hand. The "entry" level massmarket private housing attracts mainly upgraders, who currently live in public (starter) housing flats (Sing, Tsai and Chen, 2006) . This group of public housing buyers who move up to the entry-level private properties is usually referred to as "HDB upgraders".
Under the concurrent ownership policy, the "HDB upgraders" who fulfil the MOP requirement are not compelled to sell their starter houses, when they purchase the second private non-landed properties for investment purpose. Why will HDB upgraders then move out of the public housing market and up the housing ladder into the private housing market? There are three possible hypotheses explaining differential responses between private housing buyers and public housing buyers in the private non-landed housing markets.
First, the concurrent ownership policy disallows private owner who live private housing units to purchase public housing flats. They must sell their private housing units within a stipulated time after they have purchased a resale public housing unit. The pressure to sell private houses (usually within 6 months from the date of purchase of the resale public flats) adversely impact prices when they sell their private houses. Second, for public housing owners, especially SCs who have bought public housing flats directly from HDB at a concessionary price, they are not bound by the policy; and they could sell their public housing units and use the realized capital gains to upgrade to more expensive, but better quality private houses. The wealth effects induce public housing owners to spend more on private housing purchases. Third, in the upward mobility process, public housing owners increase their housing consumption utilities by purchasing private houses that are superior in quality than their existing public housing flats. The cross-segment substitution of the housing type is another reason that increases the private housing transactions by "HDB upgraders". The higher transaction prices of public housing buyers could also be caused by information asymmetries of public housing buyers, who may not be as informed in the private housing market.
We analyse the purchasing behaviours of the private housing buyers (the treatment group) and the public housing buyers (the control group). Figure 1 shows the kernel density plots on the transactions prices by the private housing buyers and the public housing buyers in the pre-and post-2010 policy periods. The pre-(dashed line) and post-policy (dash-dotted line) purchasing price kernels shift to the right for the public housing buyers' transactions. The parallel shifts, together with an increase in the mean of the logarithm of price are related to public housing buyers' upgrading to the private market. The kernel density lines for the private housing buyers display patterns that are different from the parallel shift observed in the public housing buyers' price kernels. We observe significant changes in the private housing buyers' price kernels in in the pre-and the post-policy periods (from the darkened pre-policy line to the dotted postpolicy line). The demand restrictions increase the density in the low to middle price range for private buyers (between S$0.98 million and S$1.47 million), and decrease the density in the high price range (above S$1.98 million).
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[Insert Figure 1 here] Figure 2 plots the trend in the annual transaction volumes against time for the two groups of buyers in the pre-and the post-policy periods. An almost parallel and increasing trend is observed between private housing buyers (darkened line) and public housing buyers (dashed line) before the 2010 policy period, which echoes the heating market during that time period. However, such trend reverses after 2010 with decrease in the annual transaction volumes in both two types of buyers. The drop in volumes is more severe after the 2013 period, and more sharply in the group of private buyers than public buyers. The results suggest the effects of the demand restriction policies, which adversely and strongly affect the demand by the private housing buyers, but have milder impacts on the public housing buyers, who are possibly incentivized by an upgrading motive.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Demand Restriction Policies in Singapore
There are nine rounds of anti-speculation measures introduced between 14 th September 2009 and 9 th December 2013 (See Appendix 1 for details). The Singapore's government uses various macro-prudential controls to limit excessive bank loans for housing buyers; and also increases transaction costs in housing transactions by imposing seller's stamp duty (SSD) and additional buyer's stamp duty (ABSD). 11 On 30 August 2010 and 12 January 2013, two rounds of demand restriction policies were also introduced to disallow concurrent ownership of private housing 10 S$0.98 million is estimated as the exponential of 13.8 (the lower intersection of the darkened and dotted lines), S$1.47 million is estimated as the exponential of 14.2 (the point corresponds to the peak of the darkened line), and S$1.98 million is estimated as the exponential of 14.5 (the upper intersection of the darkened and dotted lines). The first two numbers are lower than the mean price of S$1.49 million and represent the low-to-medium price range houses. 11 The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the de-facto Central Bank of Singapore, imposes varying loan to value (LTV) ratio on first, second and third property purchases on private bank loans. It also controls the total borrowing limit through the total debt service ratio (TDSR), which cap the debt service of aggregate loans by individual borrowers to 60% of their income. For public housing buyers, the mortgage service ratio of 30% is imposed on private bank loans.
unit and public housing flats by Singaporean residents; and these two policies are used in our policy experiment in this study.
Prior to the 2010 policy, private housing owners who do not meet the eligibility criteria to buy new public housing flats directly from HDB, could purchase public housing flats from the resale (secondary) market. After the concurrent ownership policy was implemented in 2010, private housing owners are no longer allowed to buy a resale public housing flat, while keeping their existing private housing units for investment purposes. If they buy a resale public housing flat, they are required under the policy to sell their private housing units within six months from the date of purchase of the resale public housing unit. The policy aims to insulate the resale public housing market from excessive speculative activities by buyers, who could afford to own private houses. The 2010 policy does not affect public housing owners (both SCs and SPRs), because these owners who have stayed in their existing public housing flat for 5 years or more, they are deemed to meet the 5-year MOP requirement, and not required to sell their public housing flats when they purchase the second private housing units for investment purposes.
On 12 January 2013, the concurrent ownership policy is extended to disallow SPRs, who are like other private housing owners, to own at any one time both a public housing flat and a private housing unit. We could broadly summarize the two round of demand restrictions and their respective effects on the two groups of buyers in the 
Data and Empirical Methodology
Data Source
We obtain the non-landed private housing transaction data from the Real Estate Information System (REALIS) database, which is managed by the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), for a 10-year sample period spanning from September 2005 to August 2015 in our empirical analyses. We exclude 447 enbloc sales involving more than one owner who come together to collectively sell the potential development rights on the land. The final sample includes 201,774 non-landed private property transactions, which are composed of 66% of condominiums and 34% of apartments. The data contain transaction details, such as floor level, unit size, property type, purchaser indicator, lease tenure, postal code and postal sector. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of key variables used in our analyses (descriptions of the variables are given in Appendix 2). The average transaction price adjusted by consumer price index (CPI) (with reference to the price in the first quarter (Q1) of 2014) is estimated at S$1,492,146. Based on the average unit size of 112.5 square metre (sqm), the average unit (per sqm) price is estimated at S$13,263.5. Private homeowners make up approximately two thirds of the sample buyers, whereas public homeowners make up the remaining one third of the sample buyers. New sales constitute 60% of the housing sample with an average age of 4.55 years as at the transaction dates. Based on the price-based sorting mechanism, we put the lower 25% percentile of the housing samples into the low-price segment, and the remainder into the median-to-high price market segment. Nearly one quarter of the sample housing transactions occur in the core central region (CCR). The average floor height of the housing samples fall between 7 and 12 floors as indicated by the floor dummy of 2. Properties with freehold tenure makes up 48.3% of the sample.
Using the ArcGIS tool, we measure the straight line distances (in meters) of each property, which is identified by a unique 6-digit postal code, to the surrounding amenities, such as the nearest Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) stations, shopping centres, bus interchanges, primary schools, expressways nd central business district (CBD). These variables are included in the model to control for spatial variations at the building level.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Empirical Design
In the policy experiment, we apply the difference-in-differences strategy to empirically test for variations in housing transaction prices between the private and the public house buyers "before" and "after" the concurrent ownership periods. The semi-log hedonic pricing model is specified as follows:
where "lpriceit" is the natural logarithm of transacted price; " 2010 " is the first time dummy that equals to 1, if a transaction occurs after the introduction of the first concurrent ownership policy on 30 August 2010; and " 2013 " is the second time dummy that equals to 1, if a transaction occurs after the second round of concurrent policy on 12 January 2013; and 0 otherwise. Private housing buyers are identified as the treatment group, and represented by the dummy " " that equals to 1; and otherwise, equals to 0 for the control group of public housing buyers; Xit represents a vector of property attributes, which include property type (apartment or condominium), unit area, lease tenure, floor level, type of sale, property type and age; and a vector of neighbourhood characteristics, which include distances to various amenities (MRT stations, shopping centres, bus interchanges, primary schools, expressways and also the central business district (CBD). We include the year and quarter fixed effects, τt; and the location fixed effect (captured by the first 2 digit of the postal code), λi,; and is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term.
Instead of the 3-year treatment window for the concurrent restriction policy in Equation (1), we break down the treatment effects by replacing the "After(t)" with a series of year dummies after the 2010 policy, ("i"year After 2010"), where (i=1,2,3,4,5); and the smaller treatment intervals could help to remove potential confounding effects associated with other demandside housing measures introduced between 2009 and 2013. We also interact each of the "year after the policy (2010)" dummy with the private buyer dummy in the model; and keep other control variables as in Equation (1). 12 Figure 4 illustrates the difference in the average housing transaction price (in logarithm term) between private and public (HDB) housing buyers against time (X-axis), controlling for the year and quarter effects. The darkened line represents the difference in transaction price (in logarithm) over time and the dashed line represents the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) difference in transaction price (in logarithm). The two vertical lines indicate the two rounds of the demand restrictions in August 2010 and January 2013, respectively. Before the first-round policy, the price differences between the private housing buyers (the treatment group) and the public housing buyers (the control group) are approximately flat; and the private housing buyers (the treatment group) pay relatively higher purchasing prices in their purchases., The price differences decrease moderately after the first-round policy, and subsequently the price differences nearly converge after the second round policy. The temporal changes in the price differences between the private and the public housing buyers provide graphical evidence supporting differential pricing trends in private housing purchases by the private and the public housing buyers.
[Insert Figure 4 here] Next, we test the first round concurrent ownership policy effects using the transaction data covering the three-year windows before and after the 2010 policy implementation. We then extend the window to 5 years before and after the 2010 period, and include the second time dummy to capture the second-round policy effects. We run various heterogeneity tests by using sub-samples sorted by sale type (new sale versus resale), region (core central region versus fringe regions), market segment (low-end market versus median-to-high end market), and unit size (shoebox size versus large size). We include the interactive transaction volume and price terms to further test differential behavioural responses of the two types of buyers to the demand restriction policies. (1) show the results on the treatment effects of the first-round policy (30 th August 2010) with the 3-year pre and post-policy windows.
Empirical Results
Policy Effects on Private Housing Buyers
Column (2) replace the dummy of after2010 with a series of year dummies after the policy, as discussed in Section 4.2. Column (3) replicates Column (1) with the 5-year pre and post-2010 policy windows from September 2005 to August 2015. Column (4) includes the second-round policy dummy (13 rd January 2013). Column (5) replicates the results in Column (2) using the 5-year pre-and post-policy windows. Column (6) presents a placebo test on the parallel pretrends between the treatment and the control groups in the DID specification. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The signs and magnitudes of the control variables are as expected, and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Freehold properties are approximately 10 to 14% higher in price than leasehold properties; condominiums are10 to 11% more expensive than apartments; and resale properties are 5 to 6% less expensive than properties in the new and sub-sales.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Based on the 3-year pre-and post-policy window periods, the baseline model in Column (1) affirms the rising housing price trends in the housing market. The coefficient on "After2010" is statistically significant at the 1% level showing a higher post-trend (August 2010 -July 2013) private housing prices of 3.36% above the pre-policy price level (July 2007 -July 2010). The increasing price trend after the first-round policy is persistent when we extend the window period to 5 years before and after the policy (Columns (3) - (4)). However, Column (4) shows that the second-round concurrent ownership restrictions cause private housing prices to decline by 1.31% relatively to the control period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , and the result is statistically and economically significant. In Columns (2) and (5) where the year-by-year dummies are used in lieu of the two policy year dummies, we observe significant declining price trends especially 3 years after the 2010 policy periods. The declining price trend is also observed 2 years after 2010 in Column (5), but the effects is smaller than the magnitude of declines in years 3 to 5.
We find that the "private buyer" dummy has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all the specifications in Columns (1) -(5). The higher prices paid by private housing buyers may capture larger income effect relative to that of public housing buyers. The "private buyer" variable is a clean identification to separate buying behaviours between the two groups of buyers. If the concurrent ownership policy has discriminating impact on private housing buyers, but not on public housing buyers, we may expect differentiated responses from the two types of buyers. The coefficient, γ, picks up the treatment effect of the concurrent ownership policy; and the negative policy effects are statistically significant indicating that private buyers' purchases drop by 2.06% relative to public buyers' purchases in the private housing market in the 3-year post-policy window periods (Column 1). When we separate the effects by year (Column 2), the negative policy effects on private buyers' purchase prices persist, and the yearprivate buyer interactive coefficients are statistically significance at less than 1% level. The results imply that the policy treatment effects increase incremental with the years (since the 2010 policy introduction).
When a longer 5-year policy window is used, we find a significantly larger price decrease of 3.05% at a less than 1% level (Column 3). When the second-round policy dummy in 2013 is added, which further restricts SPRs' rights to concurrently own a private housing unit and a public housing flat, we find a further price reduction by 1.8% in the purchases by private housing owners (Column 4). The interaction terms of the private buyers with the two policy time dummies ("After2010" and "After2013") are both statistically significant at less than 1% level. The results imply that private housing buyers pay lower price relative to public housing buyers when they buy comparable private non-landed houses after the 2 rounds of ownership restrictions in 2010 and 2013. The demand restrictions imposed on the public housing market seems to generate negative spillover price effects onto the private housing market. The results are also consistent, when we break down the policy effects using the year-by-year policy dummies in Column (5).
There are two possible explanations for the negative treatment effects on private housing buyers vis-à-vis public housing buyers. From the private housing investors' perspective, the force-sale story is consistent with the motive of private investors to sell their private properties for lower prices, because of the need to comply with the concurrent ownership policy. However, from the public housing buyers' perspective, the housing wealth effects and the information asymmetry are two possible stories supporting their willingness to pay for higher prices in their private housing purchases.
We conduct the placebo test if the pre-policy trends in housing prices between the two groups of buyers are parallel as indicated earlier in Figure 4 . It is crucial to validate such assumption for our DID model to make sure that no exogenous shocks occur prior to the policy implementation. In the placebo test in Column (6) The results show that there is no statistically significant treatment effect associated with the "placebo" policy period, and we do not find significant shift in the parallel trends between the private buyer' and public buyers' housing prices observed in the pre-event period to have changed after the "placebo" treatment period in 2007.
Heterogeneity Tests
We perform additional heterogeneity tests on differential concurrent ownership restriction effects on prices for comparable houses purchased by private buyers and public buyers, which are classified by sale type, by location, by housing market segment, and by unit size.
New Sale versus Resale
By the sale type, we sort the housing samples into new sale (including sub-sale, which are units under construction) and resale (completed units), based on the state of completion of projects.
The resale market consists of completed units, whereas new sales include pre-completion sales either by developers or by investors. The results are summarized in Table 3 , where Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates for the new sale market; and Columns (3) and (4) show the corresponding results for the resale market. Columns (1) and (3) present the effect of the firstround policy using the 3-year policy windows; whereas, Columns (2) and (4) show the corresponding results with the additional second-round policy dummy estimated in the 5-year policy window.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3 results are consistent with the early results indicating that the concurrent ownership policies produce significantly negative effects on private housing buyers relative to the public housing buyers in their private housing purchase prices. The treatment effects are stronger in the resale market than in the new sale market. For models using the 3-year window, the 2010 policy effects in the new sale and the resale markets are estimated at -2.41% (Column 1) and -3.34% (Column 3), respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant at less than 1% level. The results are consistent in Columns (2) and (4) with the additions of the second-round policy dummy, but the effects in the second-round policy in 2013 are weaker compared to the first-round policy in 2010.
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The new sale models are deemed to be relatively cleaner estimation, which are not likely to be influenced by supply-side shocks, if any. 14 The results on the new sale market provide further 13 The year-by-year policy effects are presented in Table A3 in the online appendix.
14 We cannot rule out the scenarios that some private home buyers indeed sell their private properties and "downgrade" to the public resale market. In such case, the supply in the private resale market increases, though the new sale market is not affected.
validation to the main results in Table 2 implying that the concurrent ownership policy adversely impact transaction prices of private home buyers more than public housing buyers' prices. Compared to the results in the new sale models, we find larger negative price reactions in private housing purchases in the resale market. The concurrent restriction policy seems to have brought stronger exclusion effects that significantly reduce demand by private housing buyers the resale market, where buyers of resale units could take immediate possession of completed units upon purchases.
Core Central Regions versus Fringe Regions
We examine the spatial preference by buyers by dividing the private housing market into the core central region and the fringe region. 15 The core central region attracts more private housing buyers who pay higher price for the properties in the region relative to public housing buyers. The fringe region appeals to buyers, especially public housing buyers who buy houses in the fringe region for own occupation (consumption) purposes. The first two columns of Table 4 show the results for the fringe region, and the last two columns show the results for the core central region. The treatment effects are not statistically significant for the fringe region. However, the price reduction is statistically significant at -4.76% for the core central region after the 2010 policy (Column 3); and a larger price reduction of -6.41% is observed after the second-round policy in 2013 (Column 4). The regional variations in the price shocks may be explained by the housing wealth of public housing buyers, who sell their public housing flats and upgrade to better quality houses in the core central region. The core central region may also attract some public housing buyers who buy second private houses in the region for investment motives.
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[Insert Table 4 here]
Mass-Market Housing Segment
We further test the treatment effects in the mass-market segment vis-à-vis the medium and higher-end segment in the private housing market. The mass-market private housing segment covers the lowest 25 percentile of the private housing market by housing price. Table 5 compares the results for the mass markets (the lowest 25% percentile) and the medium and high-end segment of the private housing market. The treatment effect is not statistically significantly in the mass market in Column (1), where the 3-year window and one policy dummy are used in the estimation. However, we find weakly significant policy effects in the mass-market segment of the private housing at 10% level in Column (2), where the 5-year window and the two policy dummies are used in the estimation. For the other (medium to highend) market segments, the first-round policy shocks cause private housing prices to decrease by 2.3% for private house buyers relative to public housing buyers, and the coefficient is statistically significance at the 1% level (Column 3). The results remain robust when the second-round policy is added (Column 4), though smaller incremental impact of 1.72% was observed in the 2013 intervention.
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[Insert Table 5 here]
The negative price effects in the medium to the high-end segments of housing markets reflect the preference for quality by public housing owners. They realize capital gains from selling their public housing flats, and choose to "substitute" the current housing units with better quality private housing units, instead of just buying another replacement house of the same quality in the mass market segment. The housing wealth induces public housing buyers to upgrade to better quality houses in the upper rung of the housing ladder, and the relative higher prices in public housing buyers' purchases relative to private housing buyers' purchases are consistent with the housing wealth story.
"Shoe-Box" Apartments
Some public housing owners buy a second private housing unit for investment purposes, while keeping the current public housing unit for their own occupation. They sit on unrealized gains, if they choose not to sell their existing public housing unit. Without the realized gains, they may buy smaller housing units for investment purposes. Buying smaller housing units, which are also referred to in the local market as "shoe-box" units with unit area of 50 sqm or smaller, requires smaller upfront capital because the purchase price in the absolute value quantum is smaller than that for larger sized units. However, for public housing upgraders who realized the gains from selling their existing public housing unit, they are less likely to buy shoe-box units, which may not meet their family needs from the space consideration.
As a further robustness test, we repeat the DID models in Equation (1) based on the shoe-box private housing units (unit size of less than 50 m 2 ) and other private housing units. The results are summarized in Table 6 . When the 3-year sample window is used in Columns (1) and (3), the coefficient on "private buyer" dummy indicates that private housing buyers pay 2.0% and 5.89%, on average, more than public housing buyers for comparable shoebox and larger private units, respectively. The average prices are higher at 2.46% and 6.63% when a longer 5-year window is considered in Columns (2) and (4), respectively. We also find significant treatment effects in both segments of the private housing markets in the post-policy period in 2010 in all the models, where the interactive "Private Buyer" and "After2010" terms show relatively stronger policy effects of -2.84% to -3.43% in the large-sized private housing market compared to -1.11% to -1.51% in the "shoe-box" apartment segment.
[Insert Table 6 here]
When the second round policy dummy as in 2013 and the sample window is extended to 5 years as Columns (2) and (4), we find no significant negative price effects in the "shoe-box" segment, but significant price effects estimated at -2.18% in the larger-sized private housing segment. The results imply positive upgrading motives seem to outweigh investment motives in public housing owners' purchasing decisions in the post-demand restriction periods. The results align with the "housing wealth" hypothesis, which is reflected in the relatively higher price effects in public housing owners' purchases than private housing owners' purchases or larger sized private housing units. 
Wealth Effect of HDB upgraders
We collect additional information on the status of housing buyers for a smaller sub-sample, and use the information to sort the buyers into two groups: "owner occupiers" and "investors". Based on the differences in buyers' registered home address and the address of the new private housing unit purchased, we identify an owner-investor and denote it with a dummy ["investor" =1]; or otherwise, he/she is identified as an owner occupier (public house upgrader) denoted by ["investor" = 0] . Due to the data limitation that are only available up to 2012, we conduct the robustness tests only using the first round of policy shock in 2010 for only the three subsamples, which include the private new sales, sales in the, core central region, and the massmarket housing units (lowest 25% percentile). The results in Table 7 show significant negative price shocks indicating that private housing investors are affected more than the owneroccupiers in the post-polity sales in all the three sub-markets. The results again align with the housing wealth story implying that owner-occupiers with realized/unrealized price gains in their public housing units are more resilience to the negative shocks of the demand restriction policies.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
Discussions and Implications
Governments especially in many Asian countries have taken stern measures to curb unhealthy flipping activities in housing markets that caused excessive price increases in the housing markets. For the measures to be effective in curbing flipping activities, these measures must be forceful and impactful enough to change flippers' behaviours. In our Singapore's experiment, the concurrent ownership restrictions only show effects after 3 years of the first round of policy 18 We run the models with the year-by-year policy dummies, and report the results in Table A6 in the online appendix.
implantation in 2010. The policy effect is reinforced with the second-round of restrictions in 2013 that are extended to cover SPR. The coefficient on the policy dummy "After2013" in Column (4) of Table 2 shows that the negative price effects on private housing buyers are significantly stronger after the second-round concurrent ownership policy in 2013.
Unlike other cooling measures (such as the LTV and seller's stamp duty), which are applied indiscriminately to all housing buyers, the results show that the concurrent ownership policies have only significant (asymmetric) demand-dampening effects on private housing buyers, but not on public housing buyers. Given the asymmetric effects of the concurrent ownership policy, we could separates the treatment effects of the concurrent ownership measure from other cooling measures, if differential responses were observed between the two types of homebuyers.
Other the price effects as discussed in our main empirical results, we show further evidence based on change in transaction volume in the private housing market by the two group of buyers. Table  9 . We also sort the transaction volumes by sale type, location, and price segment and unit size, and report the statistics in Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 here]
We do not find significant reduction in the aggregate transaction volume by the two group of buyers in the private housing markets in the post-policy periods from September 2010 to August 2012. However, we observe relatively smaller increases in transaction volume in the private buyers' transactions, which increase from the pre-policy demand of 12,442 units by only 19.30% (14,843 units) and 5.44% (15,651 units) in 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 windows, respectively. Compared to the public buyers' transaction volume, which increases from 7,259 units to 9,564 units (31.75%) and 13,712 units (43.37%) over the sample corresponding windows, respectively, the demand restrictions seem to have curbed the private buyers' demand in the private housing market; whereas the demand by public housing buyers remains strong after 2 years into the demand restrictions. The traditional housing segments of preference of investors, such as the core central region, the resale market, the medium to highend segment (upper 75% percentile) and the non-shoebox segment (large unit) show significant reduction or slowing down in transaction activities by private buyers.
The declining transaction volume reflects the exodus of private housing buyers from the private markets in the post-2010 policy periods. The gap left by the private housing buyers in the markets has been largely filled in by the public house owners, who upgrade and/or purchase the second units for investment purposes. Public housing buyers with accrued housing wealth in their public housing flats pay higher prices in the private housing purchases. While we could not reject the effects of the concurrent ownership policies from the evidence in Table 9 and the early results on differential pricing effects; we also need to put a caveat that our empirical results are not explicit in ruling out other cooling measures that could also generate negative price and demand effects in the private housing markets.
The public housing owners' purchases of private housing units during the policy periods generate positive price and volume relationships, which are not found in the private housing buyers. Based on the liquidity-induced mobility (upgrading) motive of public housing owners proposed by Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2004, 2006) , we do find evidence that the policy shocks trigger more transaction activities by public (starter home) house buyers into the private housing markets. When the private housing buyers' demand is weakened by the concurrent ownership policy, public housing owners systematically purchase better quality (price) houses in the private housing market to meet their inter-temporal housing consumption utilities (Fu, 1995) . It is the upgrading motives, and not the housing "substitution" motives, that drive the cross-spillover of price effects from the public housing market to the private housing market.
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Conclusion
This paper uses the DID methodology to test differential price effects between public and private buyers in the private housing market following the exogenous shocks associated with the demand restriction policies in Singapore. Like other event studies, we face the challenge of having to disentangle the demand restriction effects from possible confounding effects associated with a slew of other cooling measures implemented during the same periods between 2009 and 2015. While the other cooling measures, such as the LTV limits and seller's stamp duty (SSD), create systematic effects across the private housing market; the concurrent ownership policies generate "exclusionary" effects that ban private house owners from the resale public housing market. The policies, however, have no direct impact on public housing buyers' decisions to purchase private condominiums or apartments, as long as they have fulfilled the MOP requirements.
Based on the buyers' existing home addresses as an identification, we sort the sample housing buyers into the private housing buyer group (treatment) and the public housing buyer group (control), and test if the two group of buyers have differential responses to the demand restrictions when buying houses in the non-landed private housing market. If there were policy treatment effects, we should then find no significant changes in prices for private housing purchases between the public and the private housing buyers before and after the policy 21 The upward mobility could also be driven by the loss aversion Mayer, 1997, 2001) or the search hypotheses (Wheaton, 1990) . For the former, the tightening demand could possibly cause significant downward pressure on resale prices, which drive loss-averse public housing owners to sell their houses and upgrade to private houses. For the latter, when the private housing buyers existed markets after the implementation of the demand dampening policies, public housing buyers who are more price sensitive in housing choice could have access to more new private housing stock in the market. The search process could be shortened.
periods. 23 However, our results show that private housing buyers' transactions in the private markets decline more than public housing buyers' transactions in the private housing market in the post-demand restriction periods. The price declines are estimated at 2.4% and 1.8% after the demand restriction policies have been implemented in 2010 and 2013, respectively. The results remain significant when the first and the second rounds of policy shocks are jointly tested; and when the 3-year and 5-year windows are used in the estimation.
The cross-market spillover of the demand restriction effects imply that the two markets (the public and the private housing markets) are not strictly segmented. With the upgrading and investment motives, public housing owners with realized (HDB upgraders) and/or "unrealized" (public housing investors) wealth accrued to their existing public housing units could drive house price increases in private housing sectors in the post-policy periods. The declining private housing buyers' transaction volume in the post-policy periods shows evidence of the asymmetric effects of the policy on private housing buyers. The demand gap in the private housing market is filled in by public housing buyers, who make up a large fraction of private housing transactions after 2010. The lack (absence) of housing wealth effects accrued to private housing buyers could be one possible reason for the lower prices in private housing purchased by private buyers relative to public buyers.
Using a longer 5-year window in the tests, we observe stronger policy effects in the resale relative to the new sale markets; and in the core-central relative to the fringe regions. We find stronger evidence of the treatment effects in the medium to high-price market segment than in the mass market segment; and in the larger-sized units than in the small-sized "shoe-box units. The results imply the preference for quality by public housing buyers, where differential price effects are larger in the core central region, the large-unit size and the medium-to high-price segment. In our sub-sample analysis using the transactions by investors versus owner-occupiers' up to 2012, we find investors are more adversely affected by the demand restrictions than owner-occupiers. We also could not rule out the hypothesis that public housing owners, who are less familiar with the private housing market than the public housing market, may pay higher prices in private housing purchases because of information disadvantageous in the private housing market. The dependent variable is the log housing prices. The two time dummies, "After2010" and "After2013", represent the post-policy periods, which has a value of 1, if the time of sale is after August 30, 2010 and January 12, 2013, respectively. "Private Buyer" is the treatment variable that has a value of 1, if a buyer is currently registered as a private housing occupier, and otherwise 0 for a public housing occupier. Tenure is a dummy variable that has a value of 1, if a property has a freehold or 999 year tenure. Area and age are two continuous variables that measures unit size and age of the property. "Type of sale" dummy differentiates a "new' sale unit from a "resale" unit. Other control variables not reported in the table include floor dummies, distances to CBD, MRT station, hospital, bus interchange, shopping centre, primary school, and expressway. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. The dependent variable is the log housing prices. The two time dummies, "After2010" and "After2013", represent the post-policy periods, which has a value of 1, if the time of sale is after August 30, 2010 and January 12, 2013, respectively. "Private Buyer" is the treatment variable that has a value of 1, if a buyer is currently registered as a private housing occupier, and otherwise 0 for a public housing occupier. Tenure is a dummy variable that has a value of 1, if a property has a freehold or 999 year tenure. Area and age are two continuous variables that measures unit size and age of the property. "Type of sale" dummy differentiates a "new' sale unit from a "resale" unit. Other control variables not reported in the table include floor dummies, distances to CBD, MRT station, hospital, bus interchange, shopping centre, primary school, and expressway. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. The dependent variable is the log housing prices. We run the models using the two sub-samples separated by the location of housing units (core central region versus fringe region). The two time dummies, "After2010" and "After2013", represent the post-policy periods, which has a value of 1, if the time of sale is after August 30, 2010 and January 12, 2013, respectively. "Private Buyer" is the treatment variable that has a value of 1, if a buyer is currently registered as a private housing occupier, and otherwise 0 for a public housing occupier. Tenure is a dummy variable that has a value of 1, if a property has a freehold or 999 year tenure. Area and age are two continuous variables that measures unit size and age of the property. "Type of sale" dummy differentiates a "new' sale unit from a "resale" unit. Other control variables not reported in the table include floor dummies, distances to CBD, MRT station, hospital, bus interchange, shopping centre, primary school, and expressway. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. The dependent variable is the log housing prices. We run the models using two sub-sample of housing transactions sorted by price range into the segment with the lowest 25% percentile, and the other "medium and high" price segments. The two time dummies, "After2010" and "After2013", represent the post-policy periods, which has a value of 1, if the time of sale is after August 30, 2010 and January 12, 2013, respectively. "Private Buyer" is the treatment variable that has a value of 1, if a buyer is currently registered as a private housing occupier, and otherwise 0 for a public housing occupier. Tenure is a dummy variable that has a value of 1, if a property has a freehold or 999 year tenure. Area and age are two continuous variables that measures unit size and age of the property. "Type of sale" dummy differentiates a "new' sale unit from a "resale" unit. Other control variables not reported in the table include floor dummies, distances to CBD, MRT station, hospital, bus interchange, shopping centre, primary school, and expressway. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. The dependent variable is the log housing prices. We run the models using two sub-samples of housing data sorted by the unit size into the "shoe-box" segment (with unit floor area of below 50 sqm) and the segment with larger (above 50 sqm) unit size. The two time dummies, "After2010" and "After2013", represent the post-policy periods, which has a value of 1, if the time of sale is after August 30, 2010 and January 12, 2013, respectively. "Private Buyer" is the treatment variable that has a value of 1, if a buyer is currently registered as a private housing occupier, and otherwise 0 for a public housing occupier. Tenure is a dummy variable that has a value of 1, if a property has a freehold or 999 year tenure. Area and age are two continuous variables that measures unit size and age of the property. "Type of sale" dummy differentiates a "new' sale unit from a "resale" unit. Other control variables not reported in the table include floor dummies, distances to CBD, MRT station, hospital, bus interchange, shopping centre, primary school, and expressway. The time period covers September 2005 to November 2012. The dependent variable is the log housing prices. We use only three sub-sample of data on new/sub-sale, core central region and the lowest 25% percentile. A new "investor" dummy, which has a value of 1, if a buyer is an investor, which is identified by the existing home address and the new private house address; and otherwise, the buyer is an "owner occupier" and has a value of 0. The time dummy, "After2010", represents the post-policy periods, which has a value of 1, if the time of sale is after August 30, 2010. "Private Buyer" is the treatment variable that has a value of 1, if a buyer is currently registered as a private housing occupier, and otherwise 0 for a public housing occupier. Other control variables not reported in the table include tenure, area, type of sale, floor dummies, distances to CBD, MRT station, hospital, bus interchange, shopping centre, primary school, and expressway. 
. Kernel Density Plot of Log-Transaction Prices
Note: The figure shows four kernel density plots for private housing prices, where two for public housing buyers and two for private housing buyers. The dashed line represents public housing buyers' prices in the pre-policy period, and the dash-dotted line shows the post-policy period prices for the public housing buyers' purchases. Similarly, the pre-and post-policy private housing prices by private housing buyers are represented by the darkened line and dotted line, respectively. The policy is referred to the 2010 concurrent ownership restriction policy. Coded "1", if the tenure is below 104 years; "2", if the tenure is 104 and to 999 years; and "3", if it is a freehold tenure.
Type of Sale Determination of whether the transacted property is sold before or after the property is completed (temporary occupation permit)
Coded "0" for 'New Sale' or 'Sub Sale'; and "1" for 'Resale'
Property Type Determination of whether the property is Apartment, Condominium, or Executive Condominium (EC).
Coded "0", if a house is 'Apartment; and "1", if a house is 'Condominium'. Executive condominiums are coded by the "Primate" dummy as "0" to differentiate an EC from other non-landed private hosing samples HDBBuyer Determine if the current registered address of the purchaser is currently residing in private or HDB address.
Coded "0", if a purchaser lives in a private house; and "1", if purchaser live in a "HDB" (public housing). If a buyer's identity is missing, a "NA" value is assigned.
After2010 and After2013
Determine if the transaction occurred before or after the policies are implemented ( Determine the housing segment either is in the mass-market or the luxury housing segment.
Coded "1" for the mass market segment, which include the lowest 25% percentile of the sample; "0" for other medium to high end segment. Region Determine housing located in the central region and the other regions.
Coded "0", if a house is located in other region; and "1", if a house is located in the core central region. 
